The Environmental and Energy Law Update blog provides an analysis and discussion of the most critical and timely legal issues and announcements in the environmental, natural resource, and energy sectors.
The Latest on Maine’s Packaging EPR and Challenges to Left Coast States’ Packaging EPR Programs
This is the fourth in a series of Verrill blog posts on Maine’s extended producer responsibility (“EPR”) law for packaging.[1] Here we provide a brief update on the status of the Maine program and also on the status of lawsuits challenging similar EPR programs in California and Oregon, which may predict the potential for challenges to Maine’s EPR program.
Status of Maine’s Packaging EPR Program
In August, we reported that deadlines under Maine’s program slipped considerably because the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) received no responses to its Request for Proposals (“RFP”) to serve as the state’s Stewardship Organization (“SO”) under the EPR program. In an October 28th Bulletin, DEP announced that it “has made changes to the RFP incorporating the feedback it received and has submitted the RFP to the Office of State Procurement for their review and posting.” Moreover, DEP announced that “[b]ecause the Stewardship Fund and producer reporting/invoicing mechanisms will not yet be available (as they are provided by the SO and have not yet been created), there will be no reimbursements for municipalities for material recycled in 2025 and 2026.” In addition to disappointing municipalities that anticipated funding through the program, the delay eases the burden on packaging producers because they will not need to register or report on their packaging use in Maine until the DEP has contracted with the SO and the SO has created those registration and reporting systems. However, according to the Bulletin, “[t]he Department is developing producer guidance to assist with producer compliance. Producer guidance will detail producer identification, packaging material type identification, start-up registration, annual reporting, methods of estimation, and alternative collection programs. It is expected to be released soon and will be available on the program’s webpage.” So, if you are a producer, stay tuned.
Challenges to Packaging EPR Programs in Other States
In July, we noted early-stage legal challenges to similar but more mature EPR programs in Oregon[2] and California[3] that might be duplicated to challenge Maine’s EPR program when it comes of age. As discussed more fully below, out-of-state packaging producers claim that the states’ EPR programs discriminate against out-of-state producers and place an undue burden on interstate commerce, in violation of both the “dormant Commerce Clause” and the Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution. The Maine DEP and proponents of packaging EPR may find some solace in the outcome of the Oregon case. Although Federal District Court Judge Michael H. Simon initially granted an injunction against enforcement of the Oregon law based upon “serious questions” about the constitutionality of the law, after a five-day bench trial, Judge Simon rejected the challenge. “[T]he Court’s conclusion after a five-day trial” was that “Oregon’s Plastic Pollution and Recycling Modernization Act (“RMA”) does not violate either the dormant Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. ‘It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country’.”[4]
Aside from the head snap caused by Judge Simon’s reversal — initially issuing an injunction against enforcement of the EPR program based upon “serious questions” about its constitutionality only to later vacate the injunction in an opinion that brushed aside industry concerns and broadly endorsed the constitutionality of the program — the appeal of that decision and parallel litigation in other states mean that state packaging EPR programs are not out of the woods.[5] Although the California suit raises similar dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process claims, it is possible that the outcome of that case will differ from the Oregon case because of differences in the two states’ programs, a more fully developed factual record of the California law’s impact on interstate commerce, or simply because the judge hearing the California case has a different opinion regarding the constitutionality of California’s EPR program.
As the court explained, “the Commerce Clause not only vests Congress with the power to regulate interstate trade; the Clause also ‘contain[s] a further, negative command,’ one effectively forbidding the enforcement of ‘certain state [economic regulations] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.’ ”[6] Despite significant evidence that Oregon’s EPR program placed a significant burden on out-of-state producers, citing the lack of contemporaneous evidence of discriminatory legislative intent, the Court found that “there is no evidence that the RMA was enacted with a protectionist purpose . . . .”[7] The court also found that NAW did not have standing to pursue its claim that RMA’s exemption for in-state public bodies rendered the law discriminatory on its face and per se invalid. Even if NAW had standing, the court rejected the claim because the dormant Commerce Clause does not protect against laws that favor local governments as opposed to in-state businesses. The court rejected as speculative and lacking actual supporting evidence, NAW’s claim that the RMA’s user fees violated the dormant Commerce Clause because exemptions from the fee obligation created a “free rider” problem where obligated producers would pay more than their fair share of fees. Likewise, it rejected as essentially premature, NAW’s claim that the fees were “clearly excessive” because Circular Action Alliance (“CAA”), the PRO, collected $145.5 M in fees but expended only $56.5M on Oregon’s recycling program. The court gave short shrift to NAW’s final dormant Commerce Clause argument under the so-called “Pike balancing test” that the “burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”[8] In summary, the Court found that NAW’s “anecdotal evidence” of the “substantial costs to comply” on individual members was insufficient because “Pike ‘protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms from … burdensome regulations.’ ” [9] The court continued: “[E]ven if NAW had made the requisite threshold showing, the RMA’s supply chain burdens are not ‘clearly excessive’ in relation to the putative benefits to Oregon. . . . Oregon has a great and longstanding interest in protecting its citizens from the externalities created by waste and products at the end of their life, including plastics and other hard-to-recycle materials. In conclusion, the RMA does not place burdens on interstate commerce that are ’clearly excessive’ when compared to the expected benefits, and this is particularly so in the context of other environmental regimes upheld under Pike and its progeny.”[10]
NAW also claimed that the RMA violates Due Process by delegating state regulatory functions, such as setting fees, to the PRO (referred to in Maine’s EPR program as a “Stewardship Organization,” mentioned above), a private organization, and without affording meaningful rights to obtain review of program fees. The only PRO in Oregon, CAA, administers the EPR program, including the setting and collection of fees. NAW argued that Oregon’s use of a private PRO, in particular CAA, violated the private non-delegation doctrine, in part, because CAA was made up of competitors of the producers to whom the EPR fees would apply. After evaluating the provisions of the RMA that govern the PRO, the court found that it did not violate the private non-delegation doctrine because the PRO was acting in an “advisory role” and that the DEQ had ultimate “decision-making authority.”[11] The court also rejected the producers’ claims that the RMA failed to provide sufficient procedural safeguards against unlawful assessments or exactions of program fees, primarily because the court found that producers’ participation in the PRO was “voluntary” in light of producers’ options under the RMA to form their own PRO or take advantage of a “private recycling rule” to stay out of the PRO entirely.[12] It also found that the RMA provided producers sufficient procedural rights to challenge unlawful fees or exactions.[13]
Stay tuned for future Verrill blog posts on the roll out (or lack thereof) of Maine’s packaging EPR program. Meanwhile, you can access the Maine DEP’s announcements regarding the program at this website: Extended Producer Responsibility for Packaging, Waste Management, Maine Department of Environmental Protection.
[1] In reverse chronological order, those posts were: Hurry Up and Wait August 26, 2026, an Update on Status of Maine Packaging EPR – Verrill July 27, 2026, and Unwrapping Maine’s Gift to the Environment: A New Packaging Stewardship Program Set to Launch in 2026 on December 26, 2024.
[2] Nat’l Ass’n of Wholesaler-Distribs. v. Feldon, No. 3:25-cv-01334-SI (D. Or. Aug. 27, 2026); 2026 WL 2532218.
[3] Nebraska v. Heller, No. 2:26-cv-02214-DC-CKD (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2026).
[4] Nat’l Ass’n of Wholesaler-Distribs. v. Feldon, Slip Op. at 1 (quoting) New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[5] In addition to the two cases cited in footnotes 2 and 3 above, there is another similar case in Oregon – – Lollicup USA, Inc. v. Feldon, D. Or., No. 3:26-cv-01287-SI which essentially duplicates the NAW Oregon challenge and one in Colorado – – Nat’l Ass’n of Wholesaler-Distributors v. Ryan, D. Colo., No. 1:26-cv-03460, neither of which has resulted in any decision.
[6] National Association of Wholesaler Distributors v. Feldon, Slip Op. at 14 (quoting) National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 368 (2023).
[7] Id. Slip Op. at 16.
[8] Id. Slip Op. at 21 (quoting) South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. 162, 173 (2018).
[9] Id. Slip Op. at 21.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. Slip Op. at 28.
[12] Id. Slip Op. at 29.
[13] Id.